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There were no amendments to the Compensation Act during the 1983
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature. But, as any student of this
area of the law knows, that tells only a fraction of the 1983 legislative
story. In January of 1983, the legislature met in special session with one
of the primary objectives being a revision of the Compensation Act. Act
1 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1983 was the result. The legisla-
tion made major changes in the Act, and these amendments justify separate
treatment in an article to be printed in the next issue of this review.
PROBLEMS OF SUCCESSIVE EMPLOYMENT
Sometimes the nature of successive employment is such that it is dif-
ficult to determine in whose service the employee might have been at the
time of "injury." To some extent, this difficulty is a result of the gradual
expansion of the definition of "accident." If "accident" still meant the
kind of immediate and obvious physical trauma to the body which the
drafters of the Act probably had in mind at the outset, a purely mechanical
test of place and time measured against employment status would do nicely.
But when injuries are of the "developing" variety or are slow to manifest
themselves (but are still "accidents"), assignment of responsibility to one
of multiple employers is problematic. The same is true of aggravation
of injuries received in one job by tasks in a second.
If an accident sustained while working for one employer results in
disability from a legal standpoint but the employee later works for a dif-
ferent employer and suffers a minor injury to the same part of the body,
there is no sharing of compensation between the two employers when the
second injury bears no causal relationship to the disability.' All of the
cost of compensation is assigned to the first employer, in whose employ
the disabling accident occurred. This is nothing other than an ordinary
factual determination that the second incident was not a cause-in-fact of
the disability, and thus no benefits are recoverable against the second
employer.
By the same logic, if the claimant shows that he suffered an accident
in each of two successive employments and that both were contributing
causes to his ultimate disability, the court has no choice but to make
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Meche v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 415 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (pipefitter
suffered wrist injury in 1978 which was disabling, but later worked elsewhere and suffered
pain in wrist while "thumping" a pipe to line it up with another).
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the employers solidarily liable for the total amount of the benefits. 2 A
similar result should probably obtain when the claimant shows that some
indications of an "accident" appeared on one job, and the final denoue-
ment occurred on another-which may actually be a showing that there
were two separate accidents, one more serious than the other. Blount v.
Cooper Stevedoring Co. is such a case.' The deceased worker held two
stevedoring jobs. So far as the facts reflected, he apparently worked alter-
nate days for the two employers. During one evening's work for Cooper
Stevedoring, he complained of pain in his chest. He sought medical at-
tention before appearing for the next evening's work at the other
employer's premises. During that next evening's work, he suffered a fatal
heart attack. The second employer (on whose premises he suffered the
heart attack) settled the compensation claim against it. Subsequently, the
court held that Cooper Stevedoring (on whose premises he first felt the
pains of the oncoming attack) should bear one half of the claim. The
fourth circuit erroneously found that Blount "was employed by both
Cooper and Interocean at the time of his demise."' This is true only in
the broad sense. At the time of his demise, he was working for Inter-
ocean and no one else; he was not a "joint" employee. But the court
correctly held that the decedent's employment with each employer had
contributed to his death, and thus solidary liability was appropriate.
The decision in Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.' at first glance
seems to be inconsistent with the foregoing principles. The claimant was
disabled due to silicosis. He had worked for employer A for twenty-eight
years, coming into contact daily with materials which could have caused
his condition. For the next nine years, he worked for employer B under
similar, though arguably somewhat worse, conditions. About halfway
through his nine years with employer B, he was diagnosed as having
silicosis but continued to work for five more years. Employer B was sued
for compensation benefits and in turn third-partied employer A. The trial
court granted an award for total and permanent disability against employer
B and held that employer B had not established that the claimant con-
tracted silicosis while working for employer A.
Employer B compromised the main demand with the employee, but
appealed the denial of the third-party demand. The court of appeal
affirmed.' On original hearing, the supreme court reversed. The majority
seemed impressed with the "fundamental fairness" of apportioning the
2. Wheat v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 424 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 429 So. 2d 158 (La. 1983) (two separate back injuries).
3. 416 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
4. Id. at 361.
5. 415 So. 2d 174 (La. 1982).
6. Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, No. 11633 (La. App. 4th Cir. Nov. 12, 1980)
(unpublished opinion).
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loss due to occupational disease between the employers when conditions
in the various employments "substantially contributed" to the disease.
The court accurately noted that the occupational disease provisions of
the Act were of no help in deciding the issue.
On rehearing, the supreme court reversed itself and assigned all respon-
sibility to employer B. Counsel for employer B might have overreached
by urging the proposition that the employer who causes the exposure which
results in the disease is liable for compensation, regardless of who employs
the claimant when the disease manifests itself. The court found this argu-
ment inconsistent with the general principle applicable to an accident, which
places responsibility on the employer at the time of the "accidental in-
jury" rather than upon the employer whose workplace conditions may
have made the worker more susceptible to injury. Absent a specific pro-
vision in the occupational disease sections specifying some different result,
the court felt that a sharing of cost by an employer who "might have
contributed" to the disease that ultimately disables the worker was a matter
for legislative determination.
The court's opinion seems correct if there was in fact insufficient
evidence to show that some employer other than employer B caused the
disability due to silicosis. On the other hand, if there was clear proof
of an occupational disease which spanned two employments (just as the
stevedore's heart attack seemed to span his two employments), there was
no reason to deny an appropriate apportionment between the two suc-
cessive employers.
DISABILITY FROM CAUSES OF MENTAL ORIGIN
Over the past few years, -the Louisiana courts have become more recep-
tive to cases involving mental stress. The movement to consider such claims
has understandably been timid. The longer the period over which the stress
continues and the more diffuse the supposed sources of the stress become,
the more tenuous is the causal relationship between the employment and
the accident. The decision in McDonald v. International Paper Co., 7 for
example (discussed in this forum last year),' was a relatively easy case
to deal with because of the short period of time over which the stress
occurred (several weeks). During the present term, the Louisiana Supreme
Court was faced with stress of longer duration and ultimately denied
benefits. In Gremillion v. Babst Services, Inc.,9 the claimant unsuccessfully
tried to demonstrate that excessive exhaust fumes from equipment at work
7. 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981).
8. Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982- Workers' Compensation, 43 LA.
L. REv. 613,, 614 (1982).
9. 418 So. 2d 637 (La. 1982) (Dennis, J., concurring; Calogero and Watson, JJ., dis-
senting).
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caused initial symptoms of acute brain syndrome, which later developed
into a disabling conversion reaction.'" The supremecourt took note of
some evidence which demonstrated that acute brain syndrome and resulting
conversion reactions could be caused by continued stress, especially in
'unsophisticated" individuals who were less able to deal with emotional
problems. Thus, the court could have held that the physical disability suf-
fered by the claimant was a result of gradual mental stress. But the rather
lengthy period of alleged stress (eighteen months) and the borderline mental
capacity of the claimant well antedating the stress were certainly com-
plicating factors, leaving the link of causation between mental stress and
disabling condition too weak for the court to conclude that a "personal
injury by accident" at work had occurred.
A more typical judicial reaction, undoubtedly helped by the apparent
existence of a particular stress at a given point in time, is Lonzo v. Town
of Marksville." The claimant was involved in a discussion with her im-
mediate superior about a pending law suit that might have brought cer-
tain pressures upon her in her work situation. She became weak and dizzy
and ultimately was diagnosed as having suffered an aneurysm. The court
cited Ferguson v. HDE, Inc.,'2 McDonald, and Guidry v. Sline Industrial
Painters'3 as controlling and held that the aneurysm was compensable.
However, the court in Sutherland v. Time Saver Stores" reached a
result arguably in conflict with the principle of McDonald without even
noting the existence of the decision. The claimant was a convenience-store
clerk, working alone at the time of a robbery. After robbing the store,
the perpetrator apparently led the claimant out of the store, either by
simply placing his hand on her neck or at knifepoint. He ordered her
to disrobe and probably intended to rape her. Before she was fully dis-
robed, however, the police arrived and apprehended the suspect. The clerk
was promptly examined by a physician who reported that she had suf-
fered "no physical injuries."
Thereafter, the clerk was unable to return to work, apparently due
either to the anxiety about similar incidents that might occur or simply
because she was required to return to the scene of the earlier altercation.
She sought benefits based upon total and permanent disability. The first
circuit held, however, that the plaintiff had not demonstrated any "ob-
jective symptoms of injury" occurring at the time of the incident and
10. Success in this effort of course would have placed the claimant safely in the line
of cases in which inhalation of such fumes was deemed to be an "accident" under the
Act. See 1 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE § 218
in 13 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 456 nn.38-39 (2d ed. 1980).
11. 430 So. 2d 1088 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
12. 264 La. 204, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972).
13. 418 So. 2d 626 (La. 1982).
14. 428 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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thus had failed to satisfy the requirement of showing that an "accident"
had occurred.' 5
There is little doubt that the court was somewhat concerned about
affording a remedy to a person who could demonstrate no "physical in-
juries," but it chose the wrong foundation for its decision. The criterion
of "objective symptoms of injury" has not been applied for a long time,
and numerous decisions granting recovery do so without reference to that
requirement." The court's reliance on this criterion is a step in the wrong
direction. Although the matter was presented on a motion for summary
judgment, the court might have done better to permit the claimant to
survive the hurdle of proving an "accident" and decide the case on the
merits of whether she was in fact disabled by the event. There were suffi-
cient indicia of a work event to permit the court to single out a causal
relationship, and that is the primary reason for the requirement that a
plaintiff prove that an "accident" has occurred.
OFFSET OF BENEFITS IN CASE INVOLVING SOCIAL SECURITY
In Lofton v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation,7 a Louisiana appellate
court had occasion to apply the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1225 for the first time. The claimant had been adjudged entitled to
benefits for total and permanent disability in the amount of $163.00 per
week, and that judgment had become final. After the initiation of that
litigation, but prior to the finality of the judgment, the plaintiff had begun
to receive social security benefits. Immediately after the judgment became
final, counsel for the defendant requested plaintiff's counsel to provide
verification of the amount being received from social security, but re-
ceived no reply. Following a demand by plaintiff's counsel for payment
of all benefits due without reference to the social security benefits, the
defendant responded by paying medical expenses and the amount of com-
pensation due for the weeks prior to the time the plaintiff began receiv-
ing social security benefits.
The parties were unable to agree on the question of whether an off-
set was appropriate, and the defendant filed a rule to resolve the issue.
Plaintiff responded with a motion to make the entire judgment due and
payable under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1333 and for penalties and
attorneys' fees. The trial court granted the defendant a complete offset
during the period of time in which social security benefits were being
received, but effective from rendition of judgment. Plaintiff, of course,
appealed, and the defendant also appealed, desiring judicial demand rather
than rendition of judgment to be the starting point.
15. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1964).
16. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 10, § 216.
17. 423 So. 2d 1255 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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The third circuit court of appeal took the calculations made by a
social security official as correct. These determinations showed the max-
imum monthly amount which a recipient such as the plaintiff could receive
under federal law from the two sources. From that was subtracted the
amount of social security, leaving an amount in workers' compensation
which could be paid without oing over the maximum. The compensa-
tion amount worked out to be $145.00 per week. Since the claimant was
entitled to receive $163.00 per week under the judgment, the defendant
was thus entitled to an offset of $17.40 per week-the amount which would
have placed the combined amounts over the federal limit specified under
section 1225.
The court also held that the offset should apply only from the date
of the defendant's claim for a credit, rather than from the plaintiff's receipt
of the social security benefits. It reasoned that the plaintiff had contributed
a portion of those benefits; that the statute was not self-operative; and
that the defendant's liability is reduced only prospectively from the date
it exercises its right. But the court also held that the trial court had not
erred in granting the offset only from the date of rendition of judgment
on the rule rather than from the date of judicial demand as it conceded
would "ordinarily" have been the case. The court said it reached this
result "in part" because of the "rule's prematurity." This is a reference
to the fact that plaintiff argued that defendant's rule was really a motion
for modification under section 1331 and was filed before six months had
passed after final judgment. Even though plaintiff had waived any for-
mal objection of prematurity, the court felt that, under the circumstances,
the trial judge was within his "equitable" powers in fixing the beginning
date of the offset as he did.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR INTENTIONAL ACT OF EMPLOYEE
IN Jones v. Thomas, 8 the supreme court held that an employer could
be vicariously liable in tort for the intentional act of one employee upon
another. For once, the facts of the case seemed to present a genuine in-
tentional tort rather than a negligence claim being made into an intentional-
tort claim by the conclusions of the pleader. One employee had inten-
tionally struck another during work hours, and there appeared to be little
dispute that the conduct of the violator was sufficient to place him out-
side of the exclusivity of the compensation remedy. But the central issue
to be decided in disposing of the defendant employer's exception of no
cause of action was whether an employer could be vicariously liable for
the conduct of the violator. The lower courts had sustained the exception, 9
but the supreme court reversed with three justices dissenting. The major-
18. 426 So. 2d 609 (La. 1983).
19. Jones v. Thomas, 413 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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ity opinion noted that the statutory phrase denying immunity from tort
suits said simply, "nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of
an employer . . . resulting from an intentional act," 20 without stating
whose intentional act was meant. If the legislature meant the intentional
act of the employer himself, the lower courts were correct to sustain the
exception. If "intentional act" meant conduct of any employee, it was
error to sustain the exception, in light of the tort cases holding that an
employer can be liable for the intentional act of his employee."
The court opined that the statutory language "can very reasonably
be interpreted" as excepting from general immunity any liability of the
employer for an intentional act, whether personal or vicarious. It also
noted that an employer's "absolute liability" for intentionally inflicted
injuries "could be considered as a possible legislative trade-off"22 for ab-
solute immunity for negligently inflicted injuries. Finally, the court saw
its decision as lending clarity to the division between a compensation
remedy and a tort action. In its view, if the injury "is caused acciden-
tally," compensation is the only remedy. If the injury "is caused intention-
ally," then the injured employee may sue in tort.
The court's first two reasons are not particularly persuasive. To say
that an interpretation "can" be made and that a provision "could be
considered" a legislative trade-off does little more than confirm the court's
earlier statement that the language is equally susceptible of two conflict-
ing interpretations. Nothing in the opinion suggests why this interpreta-
tion should be chosen over the other. The third reason may not be much
better. The basic question is whether an injury inflicted intentionally by
one employee on the other is "intentional" from the employer's stand-
point. As to him, it is probably an "accident" since the employer neither
desired the consequences that followed nor knew to a virtual certainty
that they would follow.
The opinion establishes a judicial loophole in the exclusivity provi-
sion not unlike the "executive officer" loophole. Through this remedy,
a claimant may seek tort damages against his employer for work-related
injuries not inflicted upon him by the intentional act of his employer.
The net result will be that the cost of a group of workplace injuries not
traceable to the intentional conduct of the employer himself will be borne
in the tort system rather than, the compensation system.
Nothing in Act 1 of the 1983 Extraordinary Session affects the deci-
sion in Jones. The employer community was seemingly so certain that
a decision like Jones could not be reached that it declined to reword the
20. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1964).
21. LaBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974) and its progeny.
22. 426 So. 2d at 612.
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intentional-act exception to make it clear that only the personal, inten-
tional acts of an employer would foreclose immunity. The omission may
prove crucial. Perhaps it is not coincidental that the Jones decision was
handed down at the same time that the legislature was considering Act
1 of the 1983 Extraordinary Session, which by all accounts must be con-
sidered a very pro-employer act. Perhaps Jones is an effort by the court
to even the sides again.
Does the decision indicate the court's future reaction to other claims
at the fringe of the Act? An amendment in 1982 to Civil Code article
2315 establishes a cause of action in various classes of persons for loss
of consortium.2 3 In a decision some years ago, a Louisiana appellate court
held that a spouse could not bring an action against the employer for
loss of consortium when the injury to the employee was covered by
compensation.24 However, the court's task was made easier by the fact
that such a cause of action was not recognized under general Louisiana
tort law for any spouse.
Now a court can no longer deny a claim for loss of cohsortium on
the ground that there is no such cause of action. Any bar to the cause
of action would have to be found in the Act itself. But Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 23:1032 says only that the remedy "granted to an employee
or his dependent on account of an injury . . . for which he is entitled
to compensation . . .shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies
of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations
against his employer." An action for loss of consortium is not the
employee's action, and the injury is not done to him. Because the worker
has not died, his "dependents" have no claim. Moreover, the "loss" is
not covered by the Act, and the potential claimant is not employed by
the employer.
For a court unsatisfied with the balance struck in the 1983 amend-
ments to the Act, there is ample room in the exclusivity provision to find
a place for a loss of consortium action against the employer by the spouse
and children, for example. If the Jones decision reflects that kind of
judicial thinking, the employer community may find that its 1983 triumph
was a Pyrrhic victory.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315(2): "Damages may include loss of consortium, service,
and society, and shall be recoverable by the same respective categories of persons who would
have had a cause of action for wrongful death of an injured person." Subsequent paragraphs
in the same article list as the qualified persons, in mutually exclusive order, (1) the spouse
and children; (2) if no spouses or children, the parents; and (3) if no spouse, children or
parents, the siblings.
24. Johnston v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 152 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963). Court
indicated loss of consortium action would be merely derivative from the employed spouse's
action and would thus be barred; but the loss of consortium amendment in 1982 is tied to
the wrongful death action, which has been treated as not derivative.
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REIMBURSEMENT OF COMPENSATION CARRIER BY UNINSURED
MOTORIST CARRIER
The right of an employer or a compensation carrier to be reimbursed
for compensation benefits paid by seeking recovery against an uninsured
motorist carrier is an active topic in litigation and has been commented
upon once before in this forum." Decisions of Louisiana appellate courts
have consistently refused to permit the uninsured motorist carrier to off-
set the requested reimbursement amount against the amount due to the
employee under the uninsured motorist policy, despite the fact that most
policies have language that would permit the credit."6 The same courts
have also denied any right in the employer or compensation carrier to
reimbursement from the uninsured motorist carrier, usually on the ground
that the latter is not the type of "third person" against whom the Act
envisions such an action.27
Other than to deny a writ in one of the cases, the supreme court
has taken no stance in the matter. During this term, however, the court
brought up such a case for review and seems to have achieved a result
worthy of Solomon himself.
In Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,28 the plaintiff had been
injured while driving his employer's vehicle. He alleged that the liability
insurance policy issued to the other driver involved in the accident was
insufficient to cover his damages; i.e., that the other driver was "underin-
sured." Therefore, the plaintiff also sought damages from his employer's
uninsured motorist carrier and from his own uninsured motorist carrier.
The compensation carrier intervened seeking reimbursement for benefits
paid, praying for judgment against both uninsured motorist carriers. On
the basis of the previous jurisprudence, the employer's uninsured motorist
carrier filed an exception of no cause of action to the intervention. Plain-
tiff filed a similar exception, presumably to protect the recovery that he
expected to receive from his own uninsured motorist carrier from this
reduction. The lower courts sustained both exceptions. 9
The supreme court agreed in part and disagreed in part. It noted that
25. Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-
Workers' Compensation, 40 LA. L. REV. 742, 748-55 (1980).
26. Gagnard v. Thibodeaux, 336 So. 2d 1069 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Landry v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Williams v.
Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970) (apparently overruling Allen v. United
States Fid. & Cas. Co., 188 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La. 743,
190 So. 2d 909 (1966)); see McKenzie, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1970-1971 Term-Insurance, 32 LA. L. REV. 270 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Gentry v. Pugh, 362 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363
So. 2d 922 (La. 1978).
28. 425 So. 2d 224 (La. 1983).
29. Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 411 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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protection of the injured person is the "central purpose" of both the
workers' compensation act and the uninsured motorist insurance statutes
and sought to harmonize the conflicting positions presented by the com-
pensation carrier and the uninsured motorist carriers in the litigation. It
began by reasoning that the uninsured motorist carriers had to be con-
sidered "third persons" under the compensation act because they were
not listed as within the class of immune defendants under Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 23:1032, the exclusivity provision. Then it opined that a
definition of "damages" which a "third person" could be required to
pay under the Act which would exclude amounts paid by an uninsured
motorist carrier would be too narrow. Thus, it concluded that there was
nothing to support a broad statement that an uninsured motorist carrier
was not a "third person" in whom a legal liability "to pay damages"
might have been created by the circumstances of the worker's injury.
This conclusion led the court to the necessary distinction between the
employee's own uninsured motorist carrier and the employer's uninsured
motorist carrier. As to the former carrier, the court agreed that reim-
bursement of the compensation carrier out of the proceeds of a policy
paid for by the employee himself would violate Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1163. Thus, the court affirmed the sustaining of the plaintiff's excep-
tion of no cause of action with respect to his own carrier and approved
the result in prior appellate decisions dealing with the employee's own
carrier."°
However, the court overruled the exception with respect to the
employer's uninsured motorist carrier and thus disapproved the result in
those cases which had dealt with an employer's uninsured motorist carrier. 3
In the absence of a provision such as Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1163
(prohibiting direct or indirect bearing of compensation costs by an
employee, such as through the uninsured motorist insurance he may have
purchased), the court found no statutory authority to bar the reimburse-
ment claim.
The court's position certainly has some plausibility, and the decision
to impose a different treatment for the employee's own uninsured motorist
insurance is laudatory. But the net effect of the decision with respect to
the employer's uninsured motorist carrier is simply to shift the cost of
insurance from one place to another for no apparent reason. In theory,
the cost of compensation insurance (paid for by the employer) will decrease
30. In Gentry v. Pugh, 362 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 So.
2d 922 (La. 1978), both the employee's own carrier and the employer's carrier were defen-
dants. In Johnson, the court states that the employee's carrier was a defendant in Bannon
v. Edrington, 392 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), but the opinion in Bannon is not
specific on the point.
31. Lute v. City of Lake Charles, 394 So. 2d 736 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); see also
Fenasci v. Travelers Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Louisiana law).
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because the reimbursement is allowed, and the cost of uninsured motorist
insurance (paid for by the employer) will increase. In either event, the
employer will bear the cost and will undoubtedly attempt to pass that
cost on to the consuming public in the price of its commodity or service.
Collectively (and again in theory), the group that purchases uninsured
motorist insurance will pay more, and the group that purchases compen-
sation insurance will pay less. The only real objection to that result is
that the group that purchases uninsured motorist insurance includes in-
dividual drivers as well as employers, and the group that purchases com-
pensation insurance includes only employers. Work-related losses arguably
ought to be assigned as directly as possible to a group of employers, rather
than to a broader group including employees. If compensation were a
true no-fault scheme, shifting of a work-related loss onto another group
would not be permitted. The cost of such a shift would be avoided. But
we have obviously not chosen a true no-fault scheme since we have per-
mitted such shifts by specific provisions to "third persons" who have a
"legal liability" to pay "damages." Thus, the only question is how close
to "pure" no-fault we choose to get. In this instance, the answer is not
very close, presumably because Louisiana has shown such an interest in
uninsured motorist insurance as a source of covering losses such as these.
There is one salutary effect to the court's careful decision. To the
extent that it places such costs on the group that purchases uninsured
motorist insurance (and thus increases premiums to that group), perhaps
there will be increased pressure to require the purchase of adequate liability
insurance coverage by all drivers. That would, in theory, reduce the overall
cost of uninsured motorist coverage.
In two decisions subsequent to Johnson and upon its authority, where
only the employer's uninsured motorist carrier was involved, the reim-
bursement of the compensation carrier was permitted.32
32. Stroud v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (compen-
sation carrier and employer's uninsured motorist carrier the same, so reimbursement took
the form of a credit against the judgment rendered against the uninsured motorist carrier);
Brown v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 426 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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